We investigate whether the microfinance institution (MFI) is able to charge unduly high lending rates and obtain a profitability incompatible with perfect competition. We use a global panel data set of MFIs. The Panzar and Rosse revenue test is employed together with institutional background variables for the various MFIs. We find that the MFIs are unable to charge high lending rates and that profitability responds to changes in input prices, although the MFI has some pricing power due to its monopolistic competitive condition.
Introduction
Microfinance has come under attack. From praises culminating with the United Nations declaring 2005 the Year of Microcredit and the Peace Prize awarded to pioneer Yunus and Grameen Bank in 2006, microfinance is now being questioned. For instance, Bateman (2010) writes that ". . . microfinance is largely antagonistic to sustainable economic and social development, and so to sustainable poverty reduction." It is now being asked whether the provision of tiny loans is actually the right recipe to lift poor people out of poverty. And, microfinance practitioners are being accused of charging too high of a lending rate, existing only to make money, and being too vigilant in obtaining repayments on loans. This has brought calls for regulations and limits to the size of the lending rate.
The Compartamos case in Mexico in 2007 marks the shift in media coverage from generally rosy to more grim. Instead of presenting a 13 times oversubscribed IPO as a huge success, it became clear that microfinance is not only an anti-poverty tool, but is also a hard core business. In the IPO private individuals pocketed USD 150 million while not-for-profit agencies pocketed an additional USD 300 million. The high price was justified by the high margins stemming from interest rates of around 100 percent per annum. In the public eye microfinance had lost its innocence.
Recent events attracting international public attention include microfinance clients in the Indian state Andhra Pradesh committing suicide for not being able to repay their loans and pioneer Yunus being fired as the CEO of the Grameen Bank accused of misuse of Norwegian donated funds in the 1990s and "sucking blood from the poor borrowers" according to the Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina. Even if Norway has absolved Yunus of any wrongdoing, the current negative focus on microfinance is too strong to protect the Nobel Peace Laureate.
To protect against current media blows the microfinance industry is responding with increased attention to social performance monitoring and improved transparency. For example, the microfinance transparency initiative (www.mftransparency.org) advocates pricing transparency and urges all Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to calculate and make public the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of their loans.
The Levine (2005) comprehensive survey of the relationship between finance and growth shows beneficial effects in country, regional, and longitudinal comparisons. He reports that a growing body of evidence using different methodologies and data sets find that financial development, whether it is based on banks or financial markets, has a powerful impact upon economic growth. Levine also reports that with higher financial development comes lower income inequality, see also Beck et al. (2004) . Nevertheless, the causal impact of better access to microcredit is hard to disentangle at the individual household and business level, and statisticians are fiercely discussing methodological issues and whether the proposed positive impact is academically founded, see for example Roodman and Morduch (2009 ), Pitt (2011 ), and Odell (2010 . Critics of microfinance make the most out of the academic debate and Bateman (2010) argues that the peace prize winning anti-poverty development tool is a flaw. What is surprising in the impact debate is that the quality and the cost of service do not seem to be taken much into account in the impact equation. Obviously there must be impact differences between high-cost lenders and low-cost lenders. The need for more knowledge on interest rates is therefore also important for the microfinance impact debate.
Recent events and public attention leave the impression that microfinance has become a very commercial and profitable business driven by greedy for-profit lenders. In this paper we study whether the accusations of "bloodsucking" interest rates are empirically founded. Specifically we ask if the MFI is able to charge high lending rates and keep up high profitability. The questioning of high interest on microloans has been ongoing since inception on the industry in the 1970ies and belongs to the schism debate framed by Morduch (2000) . The balance between outreach to the poor and financial sustainability is to a large extent a question of charging sustainable levels of interest rates since the cost of lending small amount is relatively high. For example Yunus (2007) argues that MFIs charging more than 15 per cent above their cost of funds are operating in "the red zone". Gonzalez (2010) tests the Yunus limit on data from the Mixmarket (www.mixmarket.org) and finds that three out of four MFIs worldwide fall into the "red zone". Likewise, CGAP, the microfinance branch of the World Bank, finds that operating expenses account for more than half lending rates, averaging around 30%, charged by sustainable MFIs (Rosenberg et al., 2009) . Surprisingly, the study of microfinance interest rates has so far not been framed academically. The novelty in this study is therefore the use of the Panzar and Rosse (1987) traditional banking revenue model. Using a global data set of MFIs spanning the main countries where MFIs are situated we find that the accusations are unfounded. Although the MFI is, in general, situated in monopolistic competition, changes in lending rates, total revenue and profitability are the result of increased input prices. High costs and not high margins is the industry's main problem.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses from theory and from the microfinance institutional background of the MFIs. Section 3 gives an overview of data, shows descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis, and discusses the random effects model we use for estimations in the panel data regressions. Our results are set forth in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
Theory and hypotheses
One reason for high prices in market is of course the lack of competition. However, even with few participant sellers the price may be close to the competitive situation if the market is "contestable", that is, if entry costs are low (Baumol et al., 1982) . McIntosh and Wydick (2005) recognize that competition may be increasing in microfinance, and explore the negative effects this may have for introducing the poorest into a lending scheme. However, a plausible case can be made for low entry barriers in microfinance. The rapid growth in MFIs and their portfolios indicates that entry barriers are low. The ever more common practice to contract several microloans in parallel (Kappel et al., 2010) in different MFIs also implies that several MFIs offer their services on the same market. Local moneylenders continue to find it profitable to operate in these markets and increasingly we observe that local business people in countries like Tanzania and Ecuador set up their own private lending business. These are indications that entry barriers are low. For instance, it turns out that only 11 per cent of households in Andhra Pradesh borrow from an MFI while 82 per cent borrow from informal sources, mainly the local moneylenders, and borrowers owe four times as much to local moneylenders as the MFIs (The Economist, Nov. 18th, 2010) .
The entry barriers can be low since the capital requirements for a startup in microfinance are small, often because the startup MFIs are unregulated. In our sample, only 27.5 per cent are regulated, see table 1. Complying with prudential regulation will increase costs (Cull et al., 2008) , and therefore act as a competition barrier. Furthermore, donors often supply startup capital. Then, the allure of high returns in the microfinance sector induces competition from ordinary banks. For example in Ecuador more than 10% of the loan portfolios in commercial banks are on average composite of microcredit loans. So, if the microfinance markets are easily contestable in this sense, profits should be low, and the lending rate should reflect changes in input prices.
On the other hand, the poor customers that microbanks target have been termed "unbankable" as ordinary banks have found it difficult to develop ways to reach these customers. The common features of the microfinance business model is the outreach to a poor customer segment, small loans, short maturity, and very frequent repayments (Helms, 2006) . Yunus (1998) informs that the Grameen Bank collects repayments each week, although more flexibility is allowed in longer-term client relationships. Thus, MFIs may have established customer relationships that later lenders find hard to replicate. Shaffer (1998) and Berger et al. (2001) observe that new lenders in a market often hesitate to extend credit to mainly small, informationally "opaque" firms. This is replicated in microfinance, where larger, outside banks have often reverted to a franchise form of lending through local agents in order to overcome the information barrier (Bubna and Chowdhry, 2010) . However, the rapid expansion of microcredit puts such information barrier arguments in doubt.
How can we then determine whether lending rates and profits are too high in microfinance? When a market is competitive, firms will use marginal cost pricing, and therefore the cost functions are homogenous of degree 1 in the input prices. This implies that a given percentage rise in input prices will be carried over to an equal percentage rise in the output prices, when other conditions remain constant. An MFI operating in a competitive market must adjust its lending rate to pass along the rise in costs if it is to stay solvent. In such a market the MFI will have problems in attaining a higher than break even profits.
Thus, the question is whether product pricing by MFIs conform to marginal cost pricing.
We test for this by applying the Panzar and Rosse (1987) revenue test to MFIs. The data for the tests are taken from third-party MFI rating agencies, who collect information by visiting the MFI and recording information following a standard set of procedures. Our data is further described in section 3.
We follow Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Shaffer (2004) among many others in employing the Panzar and Rosse (1987) revenue test to banking. The Panzar and Rosse (1987) model gives a procedure for studying the price of bank loans from a reduced structural equation of the form
where T R it is the total interest revenue of MFI i at time t; P f,it is the price of factor input f ; and X k,it is control variable k. For the purpose at hand, factor input prices are interest rates on borrowed capital, the wage rate, a rate for fixed assets employed, and the rate for administrative costs. We use a number of firm and country controls as described below.
The great advantage of using such a model is that the results have a theoretical foundation. The model is a representative of the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach to banking as opposed to the "structure-conduct-performance" analysis that relies upon indirect proxies for for competition (Degryse et al., 2009) . Shaffer (2004) shows that the model may be used across markets and for individual banks. Using the model for MFIs in 73 different countries is, however, not without problems. The problem is mainly to control for the variations within the MFI industry, both for country effects and for variations in the degree of outreach to poor customers and institutional background. We discuss these below when control variables are set out.
From the theory, the so-called Panzar and Rosse (1987) H statistic may be defined as follows:
That is, H is the sum of the elasticities of the scaled total interest revenue of the banks with respect to their factor input prices. The H statistic has a competitiveness interpretation. A monopoly situation yields an H statistic that can be negative or zero. Perfect competition implies an H statistic equal to one, and monopolistic competition a value somewhere between zero and one. In perfect competition, H = 1 since the MFI passes the cost rise equally over to the output price, the lending rate. Thus, the closer H is to one, the more competitive the market. We will construct the H statistic here. It has the interpretation of an average measure of competition among MFIs (Shaffer, 2004) . The H statistic yields another measure of unduly high lending rates in microfinance.
The most comprehensive study of banking competition using the H statistic is Claessens and Laeven (2004) who cover 50 countries between 1994 to 2001, including up to 35,834 bank-year observations in total. Calculating an H for each of the 50 markets, they find that most banking markets are actually characterised by monopolistic competition with H statistic in the 0.6 to 0.8 range. Furthermore, they find no evidence of a negative relationship between bank system concentration and H, but find that fewer entry and activity restrictions result in higher H statistics and hence more competition.
Let us discuss definitions of the variables that enter (1). The measure on the left hand side is the total interest revenue. Using the total revenue as the dependent variable is the original Panzar and Rosse (1987) formulation, but researchers such as Claessens and Laeven (2004) also use relative measures as for example the portfolio yield (interest revenue to loan portfolio), which is a good measure of the lending rate. Another alternative is to use interest revenue to assets. We employ a number of definitions. First, the total revenue is defined as the total interests earned on the loan portfolio. Thus, we exclude revenues from investments, such as revenue from letting property, and therefore, have a direct measure of the revenue earned from inputs in the banking business. We adjust the total interest revenue for purchasing power parity effects using conversion factors from International Monetary Fund (IMF) data. Second, the portfolio yield has the interpretation of an average lending rate on the MFI's portfolio. This lending rate is traditionally little differentiated between loans in the MFI, but may of course vary between MFIs and over time in each enterprise. The portfolio yield comes directly from raters' reports, that is, we have not constructed the yield ex post. The inflation rate varies considerably between countries and often from year to year. In order to arrive at comparable data, we transform the nominal portfolio yield (r nom ) into a real rate (r real ) by r real = (r nom − i) /(1 + i) where i is inflation rate in the MFI's country in the relevant year. Third, we follow the common practice to include an overall profitability measure, such as the return on assets (ROA). We do so here, and also include the operational self-sufficiency (OSS) and the financial self-sufficiency (FSS), both peculiar to microfinance. OSS measures whether operating income covers operating expenses while FSS is an adjusted value of OSS particularly taking into account subsidies the MFI has received. Thus, we may study the MFI's lending practices both from a competitive measure point of view (H statistic), from the lending rate, and from overall profitability. ROA, OSS, and FSS are all taken directly from raters' reports.
The right hand side of (1) consists of input prices and firm and country controls. In banking studies the prices of inputs are generally approximated by the interest rate paid on borrowed capital, the wage rate, and the physical capital rate. We use the cost of funds (COF ) on all borrowed capital in our study, not only the deposit rate, as is often the case in former research. The deposit rate is inappropriate in microfinance, since many MFIs do not offer such a service. In our sample, about 34 per cent have saving clients. The wage rate is set as personnel costs divided by the number of employees, as Shaffer (2004) recommends. This gives an accurate wage rate, and should be superior to alternative definitions, such as total wages divided by the bank's assets. The physical capital rate is the sum of fixed assets divided by the MFI's total assets. We include the administrative cost divided by the portfolio as a measure of administrative costs. The rationale for including administrative costs in the estimation regression (3) is the MFI's expense preference or preference for the quiet life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) , that is, a market power position is used not only to extract higher profits, but also to reward inputs higher than in a competitive situation. If this is so, increased marginal costs will not be passed on to customers. All variables are in natural logarithms.
Control variables are important for such a diverse data set, and these variables are in themselves of interest for the MFI industry. Although the MFIs follow similar business practices, such as to grant loans to poor customers and small enterprises, to grant only small loans, and to require repayment in less than a year, it is necessary to control for various aspects of the MFI's business. First, the MFI's objectives are to supply financial services to poor customers and to do so in a financially sustainable way (Morduch, 1999) . Thus, it has an outreach objective as well as a financial one. Our outreach measure is the average loan, which is a common measure of outreach to poor customers. The interpretation is that the smaller the average loan is, the better the outreach objective is met (Schreiner, 2002; Mersland and Strøm, 2010) .
Second, we add the MFI's size, measured as its total assets, as a firm specific control variable together with the MFI's experience in microfinance, and the portfolio at risk 30 days overdue (P aR30). The MFI's total assets is the definition of MFI size here. The MFI size varies considerably, the largest in our sample reaching about USD 250 million of assets, the smallest less than USD 100,000. These size differences are of relevance if marginal costs, and thereby marginal costing, vary with size. Allen and Rai (1996) find significant scale economics for small banks in a study of bank data in 24 countries during the 1988-1992 period using the stochastic cost frontier approach. Thus, if the MFI follows marginal cost pricing, the larger the MFI is the lower the lending rate should be. The MFIs are on the other hand young, having about 8 years of experience on average. Thus, the MFI's experience may contain learning effects as the MFI learns to know its customers and puts cost effective routines in place. If the MFI transfers these experience gains to its customers, we should observe lower lending rates with more experience. Caudill et al. (2009) find that non-subsidised MFIs become more cost efficient with experience in a sample of MFIs from Eastern Europe and Central Asia spanning [2003] [2004] . The risk measure P aR30 is on average 2.3 per cent in our sample, which is considerably lower than default rates reaching 75-80 per cent in former governmental programmes (Hulme and Mosley, 1996) . The much lower default rates are what makes the "unbankable poor" bankable. This risk measure is highly relevant for microfinance institutions.
Third, we also control for the heterogeneity in the MFI's institutional background. The MFI's ownership type varies between shareholder owned firms, non-governmental organizations (NGO), cooperatives, and state banks. Altunbas et al. (2001) investigate cost efficiency among differently chartered German banks, and find scale economics within all ownership categories. They show that cost efficiency may be studied despite heterogeneity in ownership. In our sample the NGOs are the most numerous with about 50 per cent of the total number of MFIs. The NGO can be wholly indigenous or affiliated to an international network (Helms, 2006) . We differentiate between the shareholder owned MFIs and other MFIs. The ownership type remains fairly stable over time, in particular, no MFIs change incorporation from and NGO to a shareholder owned firm in our sample, despite recommendations for such a transformation (Jansson et al., 2004) . Mersland and Strøm (2008) find no outreach or financial performance effects due to ownership type, however, we expect ownership to be related to total revenue.
Besides ownership type, other institutional features include whether the MFI is initiated by an international organization (IntInit), and is subject to high competition in its market. Many MFIs are initiated by an international organizations , and we control for this by a binary variable being one if internationally initiated. The competition measure is a 1 to 7 scale variable informing how much competition the MFI faces, as evaluated by the MFI's rater. If the MFI follows marginal cost pricing, the competition variable should not be significant in regressions for total revenue and the lending rate. We notice that the ownership type and international initiation variables are exogenous to the lending rate or the H statistic. Thus, these controls should hold considerable value.
The MFI's regulation by banking authorities are not in the list of institutional variables, since this variable is highly correlated with ownership type. About 27 per cent of the MFIs are regulated in our sample. Greuning et al. (2002) differentiate between three levels of bank regulation, from no regulation, to regulation by transparency, and finally regulation by limitation provision. All MFIs in our sample may be said to fulfill the transparency category of regulation, since they let in private independent rating agencies to produce public reports.
Last, we control for country effects by one simple measure, the Human Development Index (HDI), published by the UN Development Programme (Ray, 1998) . HDI is a composite index, consisting of GDP per capita, life expectancy, and educational attainment. Its great advantage compared to other measures is that an index number is given for each country and for every year in the sample.
In summary, our basic estimating equation is of log-linear (constant elasticity) form:
We estimate the relation in natural logarithms except for the categorical variables summarising the MFI's institutional aspects. Logarithmic transformations may reduce nonlinearity problems and simultaneity bias. The estimated coefficients are elasticities. An objection to using only the total revenues as dependent is that the firms may vary strongly in size. This is the case here. Therefore, we follow Claessens and Laeven (2004) in scaling the total portfolio revenues with the total portfolio to provide the portfolio yield or an approximation to the lending rate so as to provide an alternative measure. Furthermore, Shaffer (1982) develops a test for long-run equilibrium that implies that the sum of the input coefficients equals zero when ROA is the dependent variable. Thus, ROA is a dependent variable along with other measures of the MFI's overall profitability.
Shaffer (2004) shows that a t statistic for H can be constructed from estimating
and the point estimate and standard error on β 1 now correspond exactly to those on H. Other relevant statistics on (4) are identical to those for (2). We are interested in the coefficient values for their own sake and not just the H statistic and therefore estimate (3).
The econometric implementation takes all years and all MFIs to find an overall H, lending rate, and profitability. However, the criticism against improper microfinance practices implies that this has become worse over the years. Thus, a relevant question is whether the MFIs face less competition, charge higher lending rates, and accumulate larger profits with time. Shaffer (2004) uses the lagged total revenue in order to remove temporal dependence. We study this time aspect in two ways. The first is a dynamic relation of the Arellano-Bond type with differenced variables and lagged differenced dependent variable entering the relation as a dependent, and the second is to run the basic relation (3) for each single calendar year. The first gives us a picture inequilibrium in the microfinance industry, and the second tells if the coefficients are reasonably stable over time.
Data and methodology
The dataset covers 405 microbanks in 73 countries hand collected from risk assessment reports by five microlender rating agencies, MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril. The full data set is similar to Garmaise and Natividad (2010) but contains three times the number of microbanks, covers twice the number of countries and is collected by five different rating agencies instead of only one. The rating reports can be found at www.ratingfund2.org. All five are approved as official rating agencies by the Ratingfund of the C-GAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor). Their rating methodology reveals no major difference in microbank assessment relevant to variables used in this study. Outside organisations subsidise parts of the rating costs.
The data include income and balance reports and data on the microbank's background and governance. Each rating yields the rating year data together with data for immediately preceding years, up to eight years of data at the maximum. Some microbanks are rated more than once in the period, in fact the total number of rating years for all microbanks is 496. The ratings are performed in the period 2000 to 2010, which means that we have data from 1998 to 2010. Most data are from the period 2001 to 2007. When necessary, all entries in the dataset have been annualised and dollarised using official exchange rates.
The data are evenly distributed by country. The mean percentage of microbanks in a country is 1.37, the minimum is 0.22, and the maximum is 7.64. 111 microbanks are located in Latin America, 100 in sub-Saharan Africa, 36 in the Middle East and North Africa region, 73 in the East Europe and Caucasus countries, and finally 59 microbanks in Asian countries.
Our data from rating agencies may contain sample selection bias. Few larger regulated microfinance banks are in the dataset, as these are rated by traditional credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's. Excluded are also the virtually endless number of small savings and credit cooperatives and development programmes offering microcredit solely as a social service. The 405 microbanks in the dataset represent commercial and professionally oriented institutions that have decided to be rated to improve access to funding, benchmark themselves against others, and increase transparency (www.ratingfund2.org). Despite its limitations, we consider our third party collected data to be more reliable than self-reported data sources like Mixmarket (www.mixmarket.org) or questionnaires. A comparison using median values of microbanks included in Mixmarket Annual MFI Benchmarks (2006), the microbanks in our sample are slightly younger (8 vs. 9 years), smaller (total assets USD 2.7 million vs. 6.2 million), have fewer credit clients (5,591 vs. 10,000), and have smaller loan portfolios (USD 2.0 million vs. 4.4 million), and the median average loan is lower (USD 387.5 for our dataset vs. 456 for Mixmarket). The data are for 2006 only for Mixmarket but for all years for our data, but they nevertheless give an indication of differences. Comparing averages between the two is not meaningful, since the Mixmarket data contain more of the very large microbanks. Overall, our data seem sufficiently representative, avoiding a large firm bias.
Stylized facts
In this section we provide information on some microfinance variables in our data sample. From the total number of microbanks, 405, we perform our analyses on 273. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics.
Table 1
We note from table 1 that the inflation adjusted average lending rate (or portfolio yield) is 32.3 per cent. This is high in Western countries, but one needs to be aware of the high costs entailed in this type of banking. Operational costs of the portfolio easily reaches 30 per cent in nominal terms, and then the cost of funds and the loan loss need to be covered before profits may be distributed. The result is a low average profitability in the microfinance sector, as the three overall profitability measures show. The return on assets, ROA, is close to zero, the OSS only 18 per cent over expense coverage, and the FSS at 99.1% indicates that proper compensation for the capital is not given. At the same time the dispersion is high with some MFIs achieving an ROA up to 34.2 per cent. Nevertheless, from these statistics it seems that the problem is not too high, but too low, profitability.
More information on the hotly debated levels of lending rates and profitability may be had from the distributions of variables. Figure 1 presents the distributions of portfolio yield and ROA, the two most central variables, and figure 2 gives a scatter distribution of the two.
Figure 1
The main part of both the portfolio yield and the ROA distributions are centered around some common value. A few MFIs have very high or very low values for both variables. It is noticeable that about half the MFIs have a real rate of return on assets that is negative. Thus, the problem in microfinance is not to be found in the right hand side of figure 1, but on the left. The problem is too low profitability in too many MFIs.
Figure 2
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the portfolio yield and ROA in nominal terms. We choose nominal values because these probably better reflect the standards in which the management goals are set than the real rates. The figure shows a distinctive break at around the horizontal zero ROA point. Below the observations are scattered randomly, but positive ROAs tend to cluster in the zero to 15 per cent area. This is in fact what we would expect if the MFI follows a policy of maximising outreach to poor customers while maintaining a break-even in financial performance. We also note that the worst performers do not always have the lowest lending rates, and that the MFIs with highest lending rates do not always have the best performance. In fact, of the 20 MFIs with a lending rate at 100 per cent or higher, only nine have a positive ROA, that is, 45.0 per cent. We also note that one of the best performers have a lending rate that is among the lowest (ROA = 26.8%, PY = 17.7%). Again, the Bateman (2010) claim that MFIs are exaggerating profit seeking at the expense of outreach does not find support.
We note a striking variability in the dependent variables in table 1. The same is true for the control variables X k,it in (1). The average loan shows that the MFI's main business is to offer loans to poor people. The average loan is USD 770 and the median is USD 387.5. The smallest average loan is only USD 37, and the largest USD 6,946. We removed outliers from below USD 20 and from above USD 10,000. Besides being small, the loans are given with a short duration, mostly for less than a year. The short duration removes problems of periodization of the loan effect.
Most microbanks are not regulated, in fact, only 27.5 per cent. This implies that most microbanks in our sample do not accept deposits, although the deposit banks and regulated banks do not overlap perfectly perfectly indicating that some MFIs, mostly cooperatively organised, are allowed to mobilize deposits without being regulated by banking authorities. The microbank rating means that the mildest form of regulation, the reporting of key information (Greuning et al., 2002) , applies to all microbanks in our sample. The microbank's age shows that microfinance is a young industry, the oldest dates its formation to 1923 and the youngest to 2006. Thus, the Grameen Bank of M. Yunus was not the first MFI.
When using a number of explanatory variables, there is always the danger of multicollinearity. A first check on this problem is to run a correlation analysis among the independent variables.
Table 2
Kennedy (2008) says that pairwise correlations above 0.70 is a sign of a multicollinearity problem. Table 2 tells us that none of the correlations are at this danger level. In fact, no correlation is above 0.500, the highest being 0.475 between the wage rate and assets (both in logarithm). We conclude that multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem for our analysis.
Methodology
We employ panel data in our analyses, that is, we have more than one observation per MFI. The panel data are of the "large N , small T " type, as the data comprise 405 MFIs and a maximum of eight observation per MFI. The estimation equation (3) is written as a basic unobserved effects model (Wooldridge, 2010) where the c i are time invariant MFI heterogeneity, and the ε it are called idiosyncratic errors because they change across time t as well as between MFIs i. In the random effects model the time invariant MFI heterogeneity is supposed to be random. Since this assumption implies an omitted variables problem, we include time invariant control variables such as the MFI's incorporation and its regulation as well as ordinary variables in order to limit the omissions as much as possible. Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) underline the importance of creating robust standard errors by clustering at the unit (MFI) level when the number of cross-sectional units are much larger than the number of time periods. Such clustering produces a consistent variance-covariance matrix estimator when the errors are not identically distributed over the panels or serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors ε it is likely to occur 1 .
We perform two robustness checks, both related to the stability of the parameters β i . Shaffer (2004) notes that an H statistic lower than 1 and higher zero indicates an unstable market equilibrium, and that therefore, the competitive situation may change. If the MFIs are in in disequilibrium, Goddard and Wilson (2009) suggest we should investigate the relations between inputs and outputs in a dynamic model. Shaffer (2004) captures dynamism by introducing a trend term or by interacting time dummies with input prices.
We perform an Arellano-Bond/Blundell-Bond (Arellano, 2003) estimation where the variables are differenced one period. To make the relation dynamic, the lagged, differenced dependent variable enters as independent. The independent is lagged one or more periods, depending on the data. The instruments for GMM estimations are constructed from earlier realisations of differenced variables and of the variables in levels. Specifically, (1) may be rewritten in dynamic form as
The Arellano-Bond/Blundell-Bond estimation is a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodology. A large number of instruments are generated from the orthogonal moment conditions E (∆y is ∆ε it ) = 0 for s ≤ t − 2 in (1) and the moment conditions in levels E (∆y it−1 ε it ) = 0, so that y it−1 may be used as an instrument. We notice that the y it in this case is the dependent variable, and that the model implicitly used here for illustration is the pure time series model with only the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side. The model is generalisable to the inclusion of other explanatory variables. The two-step GMM estimator corrected for finite sample variance Windmeijer (2005) is our estimation method. It turns out that only one lag of the dependent variable is needed, which is favourable given the "large N short T " nature of our panel data.
The second robustness check is to run our basic econometric specification for each single year
Econometric evidence
We perform analysis of the total revenue, the lending rate, and the overall profitability measures ROA, OSS, and FSS. The results are set out and discussed below.
Monopolies in microfinance?
Have MFIs established near monopolies in the relatively new and fast growing industry? Table 3 shows estimation of the basic relation (1) for all years and the dependent variable specified as total revenue, portfolio yield, or profitability.
Table 3
The table shows high levels of the R 2 goodness of fit measure. The original Panzar-Rosse revenue model is in the first column, the portfolio yield (approximately the lending rate) is in the second, and models with overall profitability in the three following columns. It turns out that the H statistic is significantly different from zero in the portfolio yield regression and close to significant in the total revenue regression. We remember that the H statistic ranges from negative, indicating a monopoly, to 1.0, indicating perfect competition, and monopolistic competition in the area between zero and one. Table 3 reports an H statistic indicating monopolistic competition in both the total revenue and the portfolio yield regressions, although their magnitudes are quite different. Thus, the first result is that the average MFI has some pricing power in its market. Shaffer (2004) finds that H is in the area 0.25-0.55 using the total revenue as dependent with inflation adjusted data and Claessens and Laeven (2004) report the H statistic in the 0.6-0.8 range when total revenues are scaled with total assets. Thus, the H statistics in table 3 are comparable to these investigations, meaning that the MFIs face competitive pressures on par with banks in markets with deep financial sectors.
If the MFIs are in long-run equilibrium, the expected sum of betas in the ROA regression should equal zero. We find that the sum is negative and significantly different from zero, thus we have disequilibrium in a majority of cases. If the sum of coefficients is positive, the MFI is able to pass along higher input prices to customers. This is typically the case in a growing industry, where the firm needs to bid up prices for inputs in order to satisfy demand for its products. But microfinance is a growth industry, and yet the sum of coefficients is negative. In our sample the average growth rate in nominal terms is about 29 per cent per year. The explanation may be twofold. One is that competitive pressures are really strong, and that therefore, the MFI is unable to pass price increases on to clients. The other is that the MFI aims for a satisfactory financial performance, and not a maximum (Cyert and March, 1992) . This will induce a negative correlation with ROA. The results are repeated for the OSS profitability measure, but not the FSS.
The satisficing behaviour explanation is further confirmed when we consider that MFIs pursue the twin goals of outreach of financial services to poor people and of financial performance. Our measure of outreach is the average loan. It turns out in table 3 that the an increase in average loan, or equivalently a lower outreach, tends to lower both the total revenues and the lending rate. Neither result is surprising in the microfinance industry. Poor customers constitute the MFIs primary market. If the MFI drifts away from this segment, the total revenue is likely to fall. On the other hand, the portfolio yield is lower with higher average loan because smaller loans are more costly to serve. But the non-significance of the association between the average loan and ROA, OSS, and FSS indicates that outreach and financial performance are pursued independently. Probably outreach is the MFI's primary goal, and a satisfactory profitability, for instance a break even situation, acts as constraint on outreach.
Other control variables reveal interesting patterns as well. The risk measure P aR30 is negative. Thus, increased defaults reduce the portfolio yield and financial performance. The sign is negative in all regressions and significant in all but the first. The total assets are everywhere significant and positive, except in the ROA regression. We notice from table 3 that the institutional variables are significant in only three cases. This suggests that these time invariant variables are hardly associated with the dependent variables, echoing findings in Strøm (2008, 2009 ). If we drop these variables, and estimate with fixed effects instead, the results are upheld (not reported), except for the average loan.
Shaffer (2004) notes that a short-run interpretation of (1) would leave the fixed assets price out of the relationship. In unreported regressions we tried such a specification, and find that our results in 3 are not materially affected.
Unstable market equilibrium?
The finding that ROA is significantly different from zero motivates a dynamic specification of (3). Table 4 shows regressions performed with the Arellano-Bond/Blundell-Bond methodology as set out in section 3.2.
Table 4
We check for autocorrelations in the error terms in the Arellano-Bond test ("A-B test"), and find that the test gives significant rejection of the null hypothesis of no serial correlation for the first lag in both the total revenues and the portfolio yield regressions. This does not imply that the model is misspecified, since first differences in independently and identically distributed idiosyncratic errors will be serially correlated. We note that higher order lags are not significant. Furthermore, the serial correlation can be totally removed by using two lags for the dependent variable, however, this results in a loss of observations and loss of significance in variables. Another point is that the Sargan statistic will tell if the overidentifying restrictions resulting from the large number of instruments are valid. We cannot run this test when estimations are performed with robust corrections for standard errors. However, in unreported regressions with no variance corrections for the finite sample size the Sargan test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the overidentifying conditions are not valid. Hence, we conclude that our models are well specified. The overall goodness of fit Wald χ 2 tests show that the regressors explain the variance in the dependent variable well.
The interest in this section is not upon the H statistic, but on parameters compared to the static calculations in table 3. In general, significant results are fewer. The lagged dependent variable has probably absorbed some of the significance from other variables in the relation. Nevertheless, we find that the coefficient values from the first three columns are comparable to those in table 3. Again wages variable is significant in the total revenue model and with about the same elasticity while the cost of funds is not significant, as before the results for wages and cost of funds are reversed in the portfolio yield model, and again the elasticities for fixed physical assets and administrative costs are small. We also note that the average loan is negative in the portfolio yield model but shows no significance in the ROA model, again underlining that outreach and financial performance goals are pursued separately.
The overall conclusion is that the dynamic specification does not overturn earlier findings, implying that monopolistic competition defines the microfinance industry.
Annual effects?
Running regressions year by year provides another way to study instability in market equilibrium and to discover whether results are driven by particular years. We use total revenue as the dependent variable and estimate with robust errors corrected OLS. We restrict regressions to the period 2000-2007 where enough observations are available, in all eight annual regressions. Furthermore, since the regressions use only one year of data, the short-run interpretation of (1) seems natural. Consequently, we leave out the price of fixed assets. Table 5 gives results of these regressions. 
Conclusion
This paper investigates what market power an average microfinance institution (MFI) has. Bateman (2010) claims that the MFI neglects its social mission in a one-sided pursuit of profits. We cannot confirm this claim using a global MFI sample collected by third party rating agencies. We employ the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model for the purpose and find that the MFI experiences a monopolistic competition. Input prices of cost of funds, labour, administrative costs, and fixed capital are the main explanatory variable, and the monopolistic competition result is upheld both when total revenue and the portfolio yield is the dependent variable. When the return on assets (ROA) is the dependent variable, we show that the MFIs are not in long-term equilibrium (Shaffer, 1982) . All the same, we also confirm the main results in dynamic settings, first by using the Arellano-Bond/Blundell-Bond (Arellano, 2003) dynamic model, and then by running the basic model year by year.
The implication of the model is that the MFI is not able, or not willing, to pass along higher input prices to their clients. We document low profitability among the MFIs. The finding that the MFI's outreach to poor customers is unrelated to its financial performance, particularly its ROA, supports the interpretation that the MFI aims for a satisfactory level of profitability and a maximum outreach, that is, the MFI puts its social mission first. The two goals of outreach and financial performance are set independently in statistical terms.
The rationale for running the Arellano-Bond/Blundell-Bond dynamic regressions is the finding that the MFIs on average are not in long-term equilibrium. Thus, we may expect more changes to come. We expect further strong growth in the industry, since a large number of poor people are still underserved in terms of financial services. On the other hand, the low profitability in the business may make it hard for newcomers to establish a viable business. The low profitability has consequences for the incumbents too. It means that the MFI is less able to invest in facilities, technology, and funds for further expansion and for financial stability. Rather than too high profitability, the profit level in the typical MFI is too low. In a rapidly growing market, there should be room for both expansion and for profitability. MFIs should put more weight on the financial performance goal in order to become sustainable and thereby provide poor people with banking services also in the long run. Most important in pursuing better financial performance and at the same time be of benefit for the poor is the sharper focus on the cost structures in MFIs.
Researchers hence need to study efficiency drivers in the industry in more detail. The "A-B test" is a test of autocorrelation in the residuals. A low p-value rejects the null hypothesis of autocorrelation. The test is performed for the first and second autocorrelation. 
